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Restituting Nazi-Looted Art:
Domestic, Legislative, and Binding
Intervention to Balance the Interests
of Victims and Museums
ABSTRACT
The Nazis engaged in widespread art looting from Holocaust
victims, either taking the artwork outright or using legal formalities to
effect a transfer of title under duress. Years later, US museums
acquired some of these pieces on a good-faith basis. Now, however,
they face lawsuits by the heirs of Holocaust victims, who seek to have
the museums return the artwork. Though good title cannot pass to the
owner of stolen property under US law, unfavorable statutes of
limitations, high financial hurdles, or discovery problems, among other
obstacles, bar many of these claimants from seeking recovery. Though
some museums have amicably settled with claimants, museums'
otherwise resistant responses are not surprising, considering the
"cultural internationalist" attitude they adopt toward restitution in
general.
US federal action to resolve the issue of Nazi-art restitution has
been aspirational rather than practical, and courts are not ideally
suited to handle the difficult policy implications present on a one-off
basis. Additionally, museums have not been faithful to their
self-imposed ethical guidelines, which promote full out-of-court
cooperation with claimants seeking restitution for Nazi-looted art.
Therefore, this Note proposes that Congress tep in to create a binding,
uniform, domestic body to hear and resolve Nazi-art restitution claims
brought against museums. Such a forum would eliminate many of the
initial obstacles claimants face, and with its narrowly tailored
application it would prevent museums from becoming more vulnerable
to restitution claims in other contexts. Finally, with a sunset provision
followed by a presumption against restitution, such legislation would
provide museums a respite from facing these claims eternally.
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In the years leading up to and during World War II, the Nazis
engaged in widespread looting of artwork from Holocaust victims,
either keeping the pieces for private collections or selling them "as a
sort of war currency."' While the word "looting" may conjure up
images of chaotic thievery (and there was certainly some of that), in
many cases the theft was much more subtle-accomplished through a
signed transfer under duress, for example, or a low price in exchange
for safe passage out of the country.2 This was not simply a method of
financial gain for the Nazis but rather a part of their systematic
1. Benjamin E. Pollock, Comment, Out of the Night and Fog: Permitting Litigation to
Prompt an International Resolution to Nazi-Looted Art Claims, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 193, 196 (2006)
(quoting David Wissbroecker, Six Klimts, a Picasso, & a Schiele: Recent Litigation Attempts to
Recover Nazi Stolen Art, 14 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. & POL'Y 39, 40-41 (2004)).
2. See, e.g., Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 149 (2d Cir. 2010); Museum of Fine Arts,
Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 2-5 (1st Cir. 2010); Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of
Art, 578 F.3d 1016 (9th Cir. 2009), amended by 592 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 2010).
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promotion of Aryanization-to destroy minority races and steal their
dignified possessions.3
During and after the war, many of these stolen pieces
disappeared into unknown hands and later ended up in US museums
that (often) acquired the artwork on a good-faith basis.4 Beginning in
the late 1990s, thanks to advancements in technology and government
declassification of documents after the Cold War, it became easier for
heirs of Holocaust looting victims to research the potential ownership
of their families' former artwork, and heirs began seeking restitution
from the museums that now house these pieces.5  Sometimes
museums willingly comply with heirs' demands, particularly if there is
enough evidence to substantially support a cause of action. But in the
event the museum does not acquiesce, the claimants are often
unsuccessful in recovering their family's art, due to factors such as
statutes of limitations, the foreign affairs doctrine, or financial
obstacles of discovery that they cannot surmount.6
Another complicating factor is that the parties involved in this
litigation-both the heirs of the prior owner and the museum as a
good-faith purchaser-are oftentimes "two innocents."' Though in the
United States good title can never pass to the possessor of stolen
property, it is also unjust to hold a good-faith party financially liable
for a wrong committed by a third party over sixty years ago.
Courts have demonstrated that they are not well equipped to
balance the difficult and politicized interests at stake in these cases,
and there is an absence of clear precedent on the issue. Also,
museums have not fully followed their ethical guidelines and have
often been reluctant to relinquish the artwork at issue, in the same
way that historically they have been sometimes reluctant to relinquish
other forms of cultural property. Thus, it is time for the legislature to
step in. Part I of this Note discusses the background of Nazi looting,
3. Pollock, supra note 1, at 196.
4. Rebecca Keim, Note, Filling the Gap between Morality and Jurisprudence: The Use
of Binding Arbitration to Resolue Claims of Restitution Regarding Nazi-Stolen Art, 3 PEPP. DiSP.
RESOL. L.J. 295, 299-306 (2003).
5. See id.
6. See, e.g., Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 957.
7. Ashton Hawkins, A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance Between
the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 49,
50-52 (1995). Hawkins explains:
Indeed, the tort of conversion is unique in that it permits a plaintiff to recover
property or money damages from a defendant who is by definition innocent of any
wrongdoing or of inflicting harm on the plaintiff, regardless of the defendant's ability
to recover against the actual wrongdoer. Despite this unusual situation, courts have,
for statute of limitations purposes, treated innocent purchasers no less harshly-and
often more harshly-than "guilty" tortfeasors.
Id. at 50.
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the steps the United States has taken in the past to address the issue,
and how other areas of Nazi restitution have been addressed. Part II
discusses the difficulties that claimants may face, including the
running of the statute of limitations, the limits of museums' ethical
guidelines, and how the general attitude museums espouse toward
restitution informs their behavior on this issue. Part III proposes a
solution that uses domestic legislation to create a binding mechanism,
such as a US State Commission, to resolve these claims and alleviate
some of the financial and procedural burdens rightful claimants face.
Such a commission would also protect museums' interests by requiring
a threshold evidentiary level for a claim combined with a sunset
period for the legislation.
I. BACKGROUND
At the end of World War II, when the Allied forces began
finding hordes of stolen artwork in Nazi strongholds, the United
States, along with the other victors, sought to return many of the
pieces to their country of origin, as opposed to their former individual
owners.8 For example, the United States created the Reparations,
Deliveries, and Restitution Division (RDR) to restore artwork that the
Nazis had taken out of Austria.9 As part of its external restitution
scheme, the United States expected countries receiving assets the
United States had located and returned to then create an internal
administrative regime to return the property to the rightful individual
owners.10 Though the external restitution scheme was noble in
theory, in practice it contained many shortcomings that impeded its
usefulness: strict deadlines, political considerations, problems at
central collecting points, and biased foreign administrators.11 Despite
such shortcomings, the United States actively participated in this
repatriation scheme until 1948, when it stopped accepting external
8. Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 962-63; see also United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F.
Supp. 2d 232, 240-41 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that, in addition to the US Reparations, Deliveries,
and Restitution Division, Austria had, for example, a Federal Office for the Preservation of
Historical Monuments and a Restitution Commission).
9. Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 240.
10. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES,
FINDINGS: IMPLEMENTATION OF RESTITUTION POLICY IN EUROPE, in PLUNDER AND RESTITUTION:
FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HOLOCAUST
ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES AND STAFF REPORT (2000), available at http://pcha.ushmm.org/
PlunderRestitution.html/html/FindingsRestitutionEur.html. The United States, however, did




restitution claims.,' Subsequently, the issue of dispossession went
unaddressed for close to fifty years. 13
But in the late 1990s, as government and museum archives
became digitized, individuals, as opposed to sovereign governments,
started publicly seeking recovery of their ancestors' artwork, much of
which had eventually landed in US museums.14 In 1991 members of
the art trade and insurance industry created the Art Loss Register
(ALR), basing it on the International Foundation for Art Research's
"Stolen Art Alert" publications, and it became a major factor in
making the requisite information accessible to the public.1" The ALR
expanded its operation and began tracking works that were looted and
dispersed between 1933 and 1945 in order to help Holocaust survivors
and their heirs identify and recover pieces they had previously
owned. 16
With the assistance of a research tool like the ALR, once
Holocaust survivors and heirs find the artwork they formerly owned,
they then often initiate negotiations with the possessor in an attempt
to regain legal title to the work.1 7  Most often claimants seek
restitution from public institutions such as museums or sovereign
governments, as opposed to individual people.18 When faced with a
legitimate claim, many museums will return the claimed artwork if,
after researching the piece's provenance,19 they find that it was in fact
taken illegally.20 This allows both parties to avoid the time and
expense of a courtroom battle.2 1 But the type of evidence needed to
fully substantiate the record of looting is rarely present, which can
lead to contentious legal disputes.22
12. Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 963.
13. See infra Part I.A.
14. See Erin L. Thompson, Cultural Losses and Cultural Gains: Ethical Dilemmas in
WWII-Looted Art Repatriation Claims against Public Institutions, 33 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT.
L.J. 407, 409-10 (2011).
15. Our History, THE ART Loss REGISTER, http://www.artloss.com/about-us/our-history
(last visited Oct. 1, 2012).
16. Sarah Jackson, Speech for Sotheby's Symposium: The Art Loss Register Ltd, A
Database for Nazi Looted Art Claims (Jan. 30, 2008).
17. See, e.g., Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 954.
18. Thompson, supra note 14, at 410-11.
19. The International Council of Museums defines "provenance" as "the full history and
ownership of an item from the time of its discovery or creation to the present day, from which
authenticity and ownership is determined." Code of Ethics, INT'L COUNCIL OF MUSEUMS,
http://icom.museum/professional-standards/code-of-ethics/glossary (l stvisited Oct. 29, 2012).
20. See Thompson, supra note 14, at 411-13, 418, 424.
21. Id.
22. See, e.g., Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 1-15 (1st Cir.
2010).
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Each party in a restitution claim can assert a compelling
reason for why it should acquire legal ownership of the artwork.23 On
one hand, returning looted art restores ownership and brings
emotional closure to the heirs of Holocaust victims for a past
grievance.24 On the other hand, when a museum displays a piece of
artwork to which they believe they are legally entitled, that display
provides a broader, public, educational good-a good museums are
designed to promote.25
The key to the museum's claim is that the museum is often not
at fault.26 First, pursuant to the museum's fiduciary obligations to the
public, it can relieve itself of ownership of an artifact, known as
"deaccessioning," only in rare circumstances, when it has considered
both the legality of the item and loss to the public.27 Second, the
museum usually has no idea that it acquired the art illegally, for the
Nazis often "camouflag[ed] theft with a veneer of legality."28 The
Nazis were fond of "legalistic formalities," and they often left a paper
23. See generally Michael J. Reppas II, Empty "International" Museums' Trophy Cases
of Their Looted Treasures and Return Stolen Property to the Countries of Origin and the Rightful
Heirs of Those Wrongfully Dispossessed, 36 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 93 (2007) (highlighting the
arguments made by both claimants and museums).
24. See Thompson, supra note 14, at 412.
25. See, e.g., About MoMA, MUSEUM OF MODERN ART, http://www.moma.org/about/index
(last visited Oct. 28, 2012). The Museum of Modern Art offers the following mission statement:
Founded in 1929 as an educational institution, The Museum of Modern Art is
dedicated to being the foremost museum of modern art in the world.... The Museum
of Modern Art manifests this commitment by . . . presenting exhibitions and
educational programs of unparalleled significance; by sustaining a library, archives,
and conservation laboratory that are recognized as international centers of research;
and by supporting scholarship and publications of preeminent intellectual
merit ... while being accessible to a public that ranges from scholars to young
children.
Id.; see also Patty Gerstenblith, Acquisition and Deacquisition of Museum Collections and the
Fiduciary Obligations of Museums to the Public, 11 CARDOZO J. INVL & COMP. L. 409, 411-12
(2003).
26. See Patricia Youngblood Reyhan, A Chaotic Palette: Conflict of Laws in Litigation
Between Original Owners and Good-Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 50 DUKE L.J. 955, 965 (2001)
("When stolen art finds its way into the hands of a good-faith buyer, one who has paid
substantial value for the art, that buyer is the innocent victim of a chain of possession that began
and remained wrongful.").
27. See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, The New Battleground of Museum Ethics and
Holocaust-Era Claims: Technicalities Trumping Justice or Responsible Stewardship for the
Public Trust?, 88 OR. L. REV. 37, 40-41 (2009). Kreder explains:
Fiduciary obligations arise under state statutory law, common law, or both and, at
least in a theoretical sense, these obligations also arise as a consequence of seeking
not-for-profit corporate status and tax treatment. Further, ethics codes are voluntarily
accepted by museums when they seek membership in various organizations, such as
the Association of Art Museum Directors (AAMD), the American Association of
Museums (AAM), or the International Council of Museums (ICOM). Museums also
self-regulate by adopting their own bylaws.
Id.
28. Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 152 n.2 (2d Cir. 2010).
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trail documenting the "legal" transfer of ownership from a Jewish
owner of art to the state, though executed under duress, in order to
"legitimize" the operation.29 For example, the Nazis might have forced
an imprisoned victim to sign a power of attorney granting control of
his assets to his spouse, allowing the Nazis to then compel that spouse
to transfer the assets to pay statutory penalties or taxes.30 As one
opinion quoted, "the signature of the person despoiled [was] always
obtained, even if the person in question ha[d] to be sent to Dachau in
order to break down his resistance."31 These pieces were often sold
into the art market, and the various collectors who purchased them
were the parties who later sold or donated them to the museums,
presenting a seemingly valid chain of title with no ostensible
connection to Nazi possession.
In addition to the innocence of both parties, unclear precedent
and incomplete discovery complicate restitution claims. For example,
oftentimes museums will return the artwork and choose not to enter
into litigation unless they believe that they acquired the artwork in
question appropriately from a party with valid title.32 This means a
museum's definition of "looting," or "acquired appropriately" is critical,
but these terms can be ambiguous and discovery is not often complete
enough to indicate whether or not the artwork fits the museum's
definition.33  Consequently, some claimants have suggested,
unsuccessfully, that courts should consider all pieces sold by Jews in
the post-1933 "depressed art market" as sales under duress, due to the
general economic and political climate.34  This argument is not
without merit; as part of its external restitution scheme, the United
States expected countries implementing internal restitution schemes
to operate under a presumption of duress, meaning that "any transfer
of property from persecutees from September 15, 1935 to May 8, 1945
29. Id.
30. See id. at 137-38.
31. Id. at 152 n.2 (citation omitted).
32. See, e.g., Lee Rosenbaum, About-Face: MoMA and Guggenheim Settle with Heirs of
Nazi-Era Owners of Major Picassos, ARTSJOURNAL BLOG (Feb 2, 2009, 10:24 PM),
http://www.artsjournal.com/culturegrrl/2009/02/moma-and-guggenheim-settle-wit.html.
Rosenbaum explains:
The case began more than a year ago, when the museums teamed up to try to preempt
an expected lawsuit from the heirs . . . . [T]he museums had asserted in a joint
statement that "evidence from our extensive research makes clear the museums'
ownership of these works and also makes clear that Mr. [Julius] Schoeps [one of the
heirs] has no basis for his claim."
Id.
33. See Rachel Dubin, Museums and Self-Regulation: Assessing the Impact of Newly
Promulgated Guidelines on the Litigation of Cultural Property, 18 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 101,
138 (2010).
34. Kreder, supra note 27, at 61-62.
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was done under duress."35  As one commentator noted, "the
declaratory actions are inviting US judges to draw the line between
forced and voluntary sales."36 Foreseeing such problems, the United
States has attempted to address the issue of restitution through
varying forms of federal action, including domestic legislation and
foreign agreements. Such action, however, has fallen short of
meaningfully resolving the issue.
A. Federal Action
In the late 1990s, public interest in resolving the restitution
problems of Nazi-looted artwork resurfaced, so the US federal
government took part in several separate actions to address this
concern.3 7  First, the government enacted the Holocaust Victims
Redress Act, which established a congressional mandate that "all
governments should undertake good faith efforts to facilitate the
return of Nazi-confiscated property."38 The Act gave the president the
authority to commit up to $5 million for research and provenance
work to help resolve the issue of ownership.3 9
Second, Congress enacted the US Holocaust Assets
Commission Act of 1998, which created the Presidential Advisory
Commission on Holocaust Assets (Advisory Commission).40  The
Advisory Commission created an extensive report covering the history
of Nazi looting as well as then-current problems and policy
considerations in addressing the issue.41 The Advisory Commission's
35. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 10.
36. Kreder, supra note 27, at 62.
37. See, e.g., Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.
2010).
38. Id. at 12-13 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Holocaust Victims Redress Act,
Pub. L. No. 105-158, § 202, 112 Stat. 15 (1998). In a case against an individual (actress
Elizabeth Taylor, no less), the claimant argued that the Act created an implied federal right of
action for Holocaust victims and their heirs. See Orkin v. Taylor, 487 F.3d 734, 736 (9th Cir.
2007). Using a four-factor test, the court ruled that no such right existed, focusing particularly on
the lack of congressional intent to support such a reading of the statute, as well as the fact that
providing a remedy for the recovery of stolen art is a traditional state power. Id. at 738-40. The
court also noted that the purpose of the Act was to help claimants gain access to information, not
to provide them with another means of initiating litigation. Id. The claimants stated that this
"taunt[ed] Holocaust victims by providing them with information to help them locate
Nazi-confiscated assets, while denying them a judicial remedy to reclaim their property if they
can find it." Kreder, supra note 27, at 61 (citation omitted).
39. Holocaust Victims Redress Act § 103(b).
40. See 22 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006).
41. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES,
PLUNDER AND RESTITUTION: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY
680 [Vol. 15:3:673
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final report suggested taking several actions, which included enacting
legislation to facilitate restitution and creating a foundation to
support research in the area.42 The Advisory Commission emphasized
that "an organized Federal role in implementing these initiatives must
be maintained, although it is equally of the belief that the Federal
government should not, and cannot, accomplish these goals by
itself." 4 3 Currently, the federal government has not implemented any
of the Advisory Commission's recommendations regarding concrete
action such as passing "legislation that removes impediments to the
identification and restitution of Holocaust victims' assets."4 4
Finally, the government signed three executive agreements
supporting peaceful resolution of conflicts over Nazi-confiscated art.45
The first of these agreements, the Washington Conference Principles
on Nazi-Confiscated Art, signed by representatives from various
countries and NGOs, stated eleven vague, non-binding guidelines that
interested parties should use in reaching a "just and fair solution"
when artwork is determined to have been confiscated by the Nazis.46
The second executive agreement, the Vilnius Forum Declaration,
expressed the same sentiment outlined in the Washington Conference
Principles. It committed to "reasonable effort[s] to achieve the
restitution of cultural assets" with no helpful guidelines and no
binding enforcement mechanism.47  The final and most recent
COMMISSION ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES AND STAFF REPORT (2000), available
at http://pcha.ushmm.org/PlunderRestitution.htmllhtml/HomeContents.html.
42. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES,
RECOMMENDATIONS, in PLUNDER AND RESTITUTION: FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES AND STAFF
REPORT (2000), available at http://pcha.ushmm.org/PlunderRestitution.html/html/
Recommendations.html.
43. Transmittal letter from Edgar M. Bronfman, Chair, Presidential Advisory Comm'n
on Holocaust Assets in the United States, to the President of the United States (Dec. 15, 2000)
[hereinafter Bronfman Transmittal Letter], available at http://pcha.ushmm.org/Plunder
Restitution.htmllhtml/TransmittalLetter.html.
44. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 42.
45. Executive agreements indicate support for an international declaration, but they
are not approved by Congress. See Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1,
12 (1st Cir. 2010).
46. Conference Report, U.S. Dep't of State, Washington Conference Principles on
Nazi-Confiscated Art (Dec. 3, 1998), available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rt/hlcst/122038.htm.
Such vague guidelines include: "Efforts should be made to establish a central registry of
[artworks' ownership history]," and "Nations are encouraged to develop national processes to
implement these principles." Id.
47. Vilnius Forum Declaration, LOOTEDART.COM: THE CENT. REGISTRY OF INFO. ON
LOOTED CULTURAL PROP. 1933-1945 (Oct. 5, 2000), http://www.lootedart.com/MFV7EE39608.
The Vilnius Forum was designed to help the signatory nations implement the policies expressed
in the Washington Conference Principles. See Lauren F. Redman, A Wakeup Call for a Uniform
Statute of Limitations in Art Restitution Cases, 15 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 203, 222 (2008).
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executive agreement, the Terezin Declaration (signed in 2009), "urged"
countries to "facilitate just and fair solutions" when dealing with
Nazi-confiscated art and to ensure that claims are decided on their
facts and merits (as opposed to procedural technicalities).48 Therefore,
although there are five federal actions that address Nazi-confiscated
art, none sets forth detailed and binding rules regarding how to
resolve conflicts over ownership of such art. Thus, this job is left to
the courts.
B. Restitution through Claims of Replevin and Conversion
Aggrieved Holocaust heirs can bring two types of claims in US
courts when seeking to recover stolen art. The first is a claim for
replevin, defined as "a common law action by which the original owner
of goods may recover the goods from someone who has wrongfully
taken or retained possession."49 In US federal jurisprudence, good
title cannot pass to the purchaser of stolen property, even if the
purchase was made in good faith (i.e., the purchaser did not know the
item was stolen).50 Initially, some defendants in Holocaust-victim
replevin lawsuits argued that the political-question doctrine judicially
barred the issue.51 The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has
dismissed that theory: "[C]Iaims stemming from World War II
atrocities tinge this case with political overtones, but the underlying
property issues are not 'political questions' that are constitutionally
committed to the political branches."52  Even though courts are
amenable to hearing these cases, a rightful claimant may still lose on
a replevin claim through myriad avenues, including when the statute
of limitations has run.53
48. Conference Report, U.S. Dep't of State, Prague Holocaust Era Assets Conference:
Terezin Declaration (June 30, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/or/126162.htm
(noting that claims should be decided on the substantive merits of the facts, as opposed to
reaching an outcome based on "legal technicalities" like statutes of limitations).
49. Kelly Diane Walton, Leave No Stone Unturned: The Search for Art Stolen by the
Nazis and the Legal Rules Governing Restitution of Stolen Art, 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA
& ENT. L.J. 549, 578 (1999) (citing Brian Bengs, Note, Dead on Arrival? A Comparison of the
Unidroit Convention on Stolen or Illegally Imported Cultural Objects and U.S. Property Law, 6
TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 503, 517-18 (1996)).
50. Id.
51. See Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 552 (9th Cir. 2005).
52. Id. (finding that restitution claims brought by Holocaust survivors, or their
descendants, did not present a "nonjusticiable political question" under the political-question
doctrine, despite the implications of a foreign defendant with ties to a foreign government).
53. See infra Part II.A; see, e.g., Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623
F.3d 1, 14 (1st Cir. 2010).
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In addition to (or instead of) a replevin suit, plaintiffs also have
the option of bringing a conversion claim.5 4 The difference between
replevin and conversion claims lies in the remedy.55 A successful
claim of conversion provides a claimant with damages instead of
ordering the return of the physical property at issue.56 But in cases
seeking restitution for Nazi-looted artwork, most claimants sue under
a claim of replevin, probably because the piece itself emotionally
connects heirs and survivors to their lost loved ones.5 7  As one
commentator suggested, "the objects are symbols of a terrible crime;
recovering them is an equally symbolic form of justice."58 One should
not discount the value of a conversion claim, however. Bert Demarsin,
a law professor well-versed in the international art trade, noted:
[I]t seems reasonable to assume that the popular interest in spoliated art is partially
due to the soaring prices in the booming art market of the recent decades. Whereas, in
the past, the potential price tag of litigation had a deterrent effect, the expected value of
the case-particularly given the high valuation of artwork in the early 2000s-is likely
to exceed litigation costs, encouraging victims to come forward. 59
Although both types of claims provide a successful litigant with
some form of compensation, both suffer from the same problems, most
importantly restrictive statutes of limitations, which prevent rightful
Nazi-restitution plaintiffs from ever receiving such compensation.
Recognizing that these obstacles apply to any form of Nazi-looting
restitution, outside the context of artwork, governments have
established various domestic and international schemes to
appropriately return the property at issue.
C. Holocaust Restitution Schemes outside the Realm of Stolen Artwork
Several countries and governmental bodies have established
restitution schemes in order to compensate heirs of Holocaust
survivors for Nazi-stolen assets other than artwork. The
International Commission on Holocaust Era Insurance Claims
(ICHEIC), created in 1998, provides an example of an international
attempt to resolve claims involving unpaid insurance policies held by
Holocaust victims.60 Under this organization, signatory parties such
54. Thompson, supra note 14, at 421 (citing PATTY GERSTENBLITH, ART, CULTURAL
HERITAGE, AND THE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 422 (2d ed. 2008)).
55. See id. at 420-21.
56. Id. at 421.
57. See, e.g., Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 2010);
Pollock, supra note 1, at 197.
58. Pollock, supra note 1, at 197 (citation omitted).
59. Bert Demarsin, Let's Not Talk About Terezin: Restitution of Nazi Era Looted Art and
the Tenuousness of Public International Law, 37 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 117, 135 (2011).
60. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 406-07 (2003).
6832013]
VANDERBILT J. OF ENT. AND TECH. LAW
as the American National Association of Insurance Commissioners,
various European insurance companies, and Holocaust survivor
associations worked with countries like the United States and
Germany to investigate insurance claims held during the time of
occupation and pay reparations in accordance with ICHEIC
guidelines.61 The ICHEIC stopped accepting claims in 2004, and by
2007 it had offered or awarded $306.24 million to more than
forty-eight thousand claimants.62
In 1998, after diplomatic negotiations between Switzerland and
other countries, including the United States, Swiss banks established
a $1.25 billion fund to compensate individuals who had filed suit in
US courts against Swiss banks and entities that had not returned the
money of the plaintiffs' Holocaust-victim family members.63  In
exchange for the settlement compensation, plaintiffs agreed never to
bring suit against the Swiss government, Swiss banks, or other Swiss
entities for claims relating to the Holocaust and its aftermath.64
Similarly, the German Parliament established the German
Foundation after claimants started bringing lawsuits against the
German government in US courts.65  The Foundation makes
reparations available to former slave laborers, though the Foundation
grants compensation only to living survivors and not to their heirs.6 6
Additionally, German law requires that in all relevant US lawsuits
that have been filed against Germany, the US government must
submit a statement to the court expressing that US foreign policy
favors dismissal because the Foundation-not US courts-is the
appropriate forum to adjudicate such claims.67
The lack of an established art restitution scheme creates a
variety of problems. First, given that the US government has not
established a collective fund that both pays for litigation costs
incurred in conflicts over Nazi-stolen art and reimburses Holocaust
61. Id.; About ICHEIC, THE INT'L COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ERA INS. CLAIMS,
http://www.icheic.org/about.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
62. The ICHEIC Claims Process, THE INT'L COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ERA INS. CLAIMS,
http://www.icheic.org (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
63. See Pollock, supra note 1, at 199 (citing Burt Neuborne, Preliminary Reflections on
Aspects of Holocaust-Era Litigation in American Courts, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 795, 805-13 (2002)).
64. Overview, HOLOCAUST VICTIM ASSETS LITIG. (Swiss BANKS), http://www.swiss
bankclaims.com/Overview.aspx (last updated May 17, 2012).
65. Id.
66. Id.; see also Pollock, supra note 1, at 200.
67. Pollock, supra note 1, at 200. Austria established a comparable foundation in 2000
to make reparations to those forced to perform slave labor, as well as to those who experienced
property loss or damage. Id. at 201. Claims are brought under an arbitration-type proceeding;
however, the foundation does not have the authority to hear claims involving stolen artwork. Id.
at 201-02. The jurisdiction for such claims remains with an Austrian restitution commission,
created in Austria's 1998 Restitution Law. Id. at 202.
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victims for the value of their stolen works,68 claimants must handle
replevin claims alone.69 For example, since the US government has
not established a comparable arbitration commission for Nazi-looted
art, heirs typically have to initiate litigation without the option of a
class action suit since their claims involve diverse pieces and are filed
against varying defendants.70 Therefore, claimants face tremendous
litigation costs that they must bear alone." Similarly, museums are
responsible for any recovery awarded to the claimants.72
Second, in most current lawsuits, the original Holocaust-era
owner is deceased, meaning that distant relatives-the only surviving
family members-are the ones pursuing legal remedies when they
discover they are possibly owners of a work displayed in a museum.7 3
Courts may feel disinclined to reward the claimant heirs with
possession when they are far removed from the original owner.74
Finally, as noted by one legal writer studying the subject, "these
arrangements only resolve the claim between the two involved parties
and do not take into account the issues of Nazi-looted art as a whole.
While litigation is second to none in encouraging negotiated
agreement, a series of individual lawsuits will not solve the overall
problem."75 Despite the fact that some governments have addressed
Nazi-looting restitution outside of the art context, the US government
has yet to craft a meaningful way for claimants to successfully reclaim
their formerly owned artwork. Thus, courts and museums are left to
handle the issue individually, without any substantive guidance,
leading to the problems discussed in Part II of this Note.
68. Id. at 207.
69. See id. at 226.
70. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23; Pollock, supra note 1, at 226.
71. Pollock, supra note 1, at 226-27.
72. See id. Pollock explains:
[T]he costs to museums have been ignored hitherto, and the adversarial system is not
likely to take them into account. For example ... the Seattle Art Museum returned [a
Matisse painting] to Rosenberg's heirs, describing the act as 'doing the right thing.'
This moral act was an expensive one: the Matisse's estimated value is $2 million, and
the museum spent hundreds of thousands more in litigation.
Id. (citations omitted).
73. See Redman, supra note 47, at 221 (citation omitted).
74. See id.
75. Pollock, supra note 1, at 230.
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II. WHY MUSEUMS WANT TO FIGHT-AND Do So
SUCCESSFULLY-AGAINST CLAIMANTS SEEKING RESTITUTION FOR
HOLOCAUST-LOOTED ARTWORK
Holocaust survivors and their heirs have met with little success
in court when trying to reclaim confiscated artwork through a replevin
claim. 76 As discussed below, the fact that courts generally grant
museums' motions to dismiss is mainly attributable to the statute of
limitations for the replevin claim.77 Additionally, museums have
historically been averse to restitution in general; the reluctant
attitude they adopt in restitution cases concerning Nazi looting
parallels the behavior they have exhibited in the past, adding to the
difficulties claimants face.78  Finally, museums are regulated by
self-governing ethical rules that courts have construed as guidelines
with no binding effect, meaning that museums may not strictly adhere
to their self-imposed restitution practices.79
A. Statute-of-Limitations Constraints
Most states have a three-year statute of limitations that
restricts the time in which a party may sue for recovery of stolen
property.80 For many of these claimants, that three-year window has
long expired, since the alleged theft occurred at least sixty-five years
ago.8 1 One state specifically extended the statute of limitations so
that survivors may bring a claim of ownership against a museum; the
law was ineffective, however, for the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
statutory extension was an unconstitutional interference with the
foreign-affairs doctrine (as discussed below).82 But these claimants
could still lose simultaneously under a general statute of limitations.83
Courts have upheld the general statute of limitations as fair in these
instances, denying requests for federal laches84 to equitably extend the
time frame.85
76. See, e.g., Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 2-5 (1st Cir.
2010).
77. See id.
78. See infra Part II.B.
79. See infra Part II.B.
80. See, e.g., Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d at 5.
81. Id. at 3.
82. See infra text accompanying notes 86-107.
83. See infra text accompanying notes 115-116.
84. See, e.g., Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d at 11. "Laches is the equitable equivalent of
statutes of limitations. However, unlike statutes of limitations, laches leaves it up to the court to
determine, based on the unique facts of the case, whether a plaintiff has waited too long to seek
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1. Von Saher: No State Intervention
In order to alleviate the statute-of-limitations problem that
many Holocaust survivors encounter when trying to recover artwork,
California enacted section 354.3 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure in 2003.86 Originally, California had a general three-year
statute of limitations for stolen property under section 338, which
stated that the cause of action accrued when the plaintiff discovered
the whereabouts of the stolen article.87 But section 354.3 specifically
granted the owners of Holocaust-era artwork, or their beneficiaries or
heirs, the right to bring an action of recovery, with a statute of
limitations that extended until December 31, 2010.88
Now much more vulnerable to suit, a California museum seized
the opportunity to challenge the statute's validity under the
foreign-affairs doctrine in Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of
Art.89 Saher was the only surviving heir of an art dealer who fled the
Netherlands upon the Nazi invasion and left his entire collection
behind.90 When the Nazis looted his gallery, they took hundreds of
pieces to Germany, including the two oil paintings at issue in the
case.91 Though the Allied forces returned the two paintings to the
Netherlands in 1946, the Dutch government returned the paintings
through a restitution proceeding to a third party, who ultimately sold
them to the defendant, the Norton Simon Museum of Art, in 1971.92
relief." Laches, THE FREE DICTIONARY BY FARLEX, http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/
laches (last visited Jan. 10, 2013).
85. See infra text accompanying notes 86-107.
86. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2010).
87. Id. at 968. Von Saher points to the California Code of Civil Procedure:
[T]he cause of action in the case of theft, as defined in § 484 of the Penal Code, of any
art or artifact is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery of the whereabouts of
the article by the aggrieved party, his or her agent, or the law enforcement agency
that originally investigated the theft.
CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 338(c).
88. Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 958-59. The Presidential Advisory Commission on
Holocaust Assets defined Holocaust-era art as works "created before 1945, acquired after 1932
and which were or could have been in Europe between those dates." PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY
COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES, AGREEMENTS NEGOTIATED BY THE
COMMISSION IN THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SECTORS, in PLUNDER AND RESTITUTION: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE
UNITED STATES AND STAFF REPORT (2000), available at http://pcha.ushmm.org/Plunder
Restitution.html/html/FindingsAgreements.html.
89. Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 961.
90. Id. at 959.
91. Id. at 957, 959.
92. Id. at 959.
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In 2007, Saher brought a claim against the museum under section
354.3 in order to recover the paintings.93
The Ninth Circuit, which ruled in favor of the museum, held
that the foreign-affairs doctrine preempted the cause of action created
in section 354.3, despite the absence of any conflict with a specific
federal law or foreign policy. 9 4 The doctrine holds that the federal
government possesses the exclusive power to regulate the US position
on foreign affairs.95 While state statutes are typically invalid under
this theory because they directly conflict with an express federal
directive, like a statute, they may also be unconstitutional if they
infringe on a foreign-affairs power that the Constitution reserves for
the federal government.96
In making this foreign-affairs argument, the museum pointed
to two sources-the London Declaration and a policy statement by
President Truman-to show that the executive branch supported a
federal policy of external restitution, a policy the state statute
allegedly infringed.97 This argument failed to convince the court.98
The United States and other Allied forces had signed the London
Declaration in 1943, agreeing to counter the "methods of
dispossession" used in enemy countries during World War II, but the
Declaration made no mention of actual restitution.99 Truman's policy
statement, "Art Objects in U.S. Zones," provided that dispossessed
artwork would be returned under a scheme of external restitution,
that is, returned to the country of origin instead of the individual
owner.100 But because the United States stopped accepting external
restitution claims in 1948 pursuant to a strict deadline announced
93. Id.
94. Id. at 963, 965-66.
95. See id. at 960-61.
96. See id. at 961, 964.
97. Id. at 961.
98. Id. at 963.
99. Id. at 961-62. Specifically, the London Declaration stated (in part):
[T]he governments making this declaration and the French National Committee
reserve all their rights to declare invalid any transfers of, or dealings with, property,
rights and interests of any description whatsoever which are, or have been, situated in
the territories which have come under the occupation or control, direct or indirect, of
the governments with which they are at war or which belong or have belonged, to
persons, including juridical persons, resident in such territories. This warning applies
whether such transfers or dealings have taken the form of open looting or plunder, or
of transactions apparently legal in form, even when they purport to be voluntarily
effected.
Kreder, supra note 27, at 51 (citing U.S. Dep't of State, Declaration Regarding Forced Transfers
of Property in Enemy-Controlled Territory (Jan. 5, 1943), in 8 Dep't St. Bull. 21, 21-22 (1943)).
100. Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 962.
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under US Military Law 59,101 the policy was no longer in effect.102
Thus, California's statute did not directly "conflict with any current
foreign policy espoused by the Executive Branch."10 3
The absence of a direct conflict with current foreign policy
would seemingly favor the plaintiffs. But the court focused on the fact
that California's apparent true purpose in enacting section 354.3 was
not to regulate stolen property within the state, but rather to create a
worldwide "friendly forum for litigating Holocaust restitution
claims."104 With its repeated references to the Nazis and the atrocities
they committed during World War II, it was evident to the court that
the state statute was a response to the federal government's inaction
on the issue.105 Thus, rather than making a stricter enforcement
regime for an existing set of rights, the court held that the state
sought instead to create a new cause of action with the "aim of
rectifying wartime wrongs."106 Section 354.3 therefore infringed on
the exclusive federal power to make and resolve war because it only
sought to address wartime injuries for a particularly limited group of
people.10 7
In a prior case, Alperin v. Vatican Bank,10s the court had held
that, despite inherent political effects, the judiciary has the power to
hear property claims brought by Holocaust survivors.1 09 The Ninth
Circuit used Von Saher as an opportunity to clarify the scope of that
ruling:
Our holding that the judiciary has the power to adjudicate Holocaust-era property
claims does not mean that states have the power to provide legislative remedies for
these claims. . . . [Tihe relevant question is whether the power to wage and resolve war,
including the power to legislate restitution and reparation claims, is one that has been
101. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 10.
102. Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 963.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 965.
105. Id. at 965-66 (recognizing that the statute was not limited to museums in California
but applied to any museum or gallery outside the state as well).
106. Id. at 966 (citing Deutsch v. Turner Corp., 324 F.3d 692, 708 (9th Cir. 2003)).
107. See id. at 965-66. The court relied heavily on a prior case that involved a California
statute aimed at resolving Holocaust-era insurance claims, Von Saber, 592 F.3d at 961 (citing
American Insurance Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003)). California had enacted a statute,
the Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act, which required insurance companies in the United
States to disclose their European policies from 1920-1945, and also extended the statute of
limitations for Holocaust-victim claimants until 2010. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 401, 409-10. The
Supreme Court ruled the statute unconstitutional, finding that it was federally preempted due to
its interference with the ICHEIC and also possibly the German Foundation Agreement. Id. at
396. See Kreder, supra note 27, for a discussion about the factual differences between
Garamendi and Von Saher, and why Garamendi should not control.
108. Alperin v. Vatican Bank, 410 F.3d 532 (9th Cir. 2005).
109. Id. at 551.
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exclusively reserved to the national government by the Constitution. We conclude that
it has.1 10
The court further supported its holding by addressing the actions the
federal government had recently taken on the restitution issue for
Nazi-confiscated art."' The court pointed to the government's
participation in the Washington Conference on Holocaust-Era Assets
and its establishment of the Presidential Advisory Commission on
Holocaust Assets in the United States under 22 U.S.C. § 1621.112 The
court thus determined, on the one hand, that no express federal policy
on the issue existed.113 On the other hand, it also decided that the
aforementioned federal actions, which provide no substantive, binding
law on the issue's resolution, were enough to show that "this history of
federal action is so comprehensive and pervasive as to leave no room
for state legislation."114
But the court stated that Saher, and other potential claimants,
could still bring an action within the general three-year replevin
statute of limitations, based on the idea of "constructive notice"
implicit in section 338.115 Under such a standard, Saher's claim would
begin to accrue when "she discovered or reasonably could have
discovered her claim to the [two oil paintings] and their
whereabouts."1 6
When a dissatisfied Saher filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court, the US Solicitor General, representing the federal
government, filed a brief in support of the Ninth Circuit's ruling and
110. Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 966-67. For a criticism of this ruling, see Jennifer Anglim
Kreder, State Law Holocaust-Era Art Claims and Federal Executive Power, 105 Nw. U. L. REV.
COLLOQUY 315, 326-27 (2011), in which Kreder cites an earlier concurring opinion by Justice
Harlan stating that "the States may legislate in areas of their traditional competence even
though their statutes may have an incidental effect on foreign relations." Id. at 326 (quoting
Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 459 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring)). Kreder contends that the
court interpreted Garamendi too broadly and exaggerated the effects on foreign relations (since
Holocaust-era claims can be brought at the state judicial level), particularly because section
354.3 was narrowly tailored to apply to entities falling under California's personal jurisdiction,
as opposed to creating "extravagant jurisdictional claims," which was an issue in Garamendi. Id.
at 326-27.
111. Von Saher, 592 F.3d at 967.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 963.
114. Id. at 967-68 ("No organization comparable to the International Commission on
Holocaust Era Insurance Claims has been established yet to resolve Holocaust-era art claims.
This does not, however, justify California's intrusion into a field occupied exclusively by the
federal government.").
115. Id. at 968-69.
116. Id. at 969.
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asked the Court to deny a rehearing of the case.1 17 The Court obliged,
thus leaving Saher with the Ninth Circuit's constructive-notice
argument as the only method of achieving a court-ordered remedy.118
2. Seger-Thomschitz: No Equitable Judicial Remedy
In Museum of Fine Arts, Boston v. Seger-Thomschitz, the
plaintiff faced a procedural obstacle similar to the one Saher
encountered: a three-year statute of limitations for replevin actions,
this time in Massachusetts.119  Seger-Thomschitz was the sole
surviving heir of a Jewish art collector in Austria who had
transferred, under apparent duress, a valuable oil painting to a
Parisian gallery after the Nazi annexation of Austria in 1938.120
Details about the circumstances of the painting's transfer, involving
questions of good faith and legal title, were unclear.121 But the
important issue (at least for purposes of this discussion) arose when
the court considered the appropriateness of applying federal laches.122
Massachusetts had a three-year statute of limitations for
actions to recover stolen property, which implicitly included a
"discovery rule" like the constructive-notice rule in Von Saher.1 2 3 In
missing-art cases, courts have often held that the claimant must have
"acted with due diligence in pursuing his or her personal property."12 4
Seger-Thomschitz did not meet this requirement for several reasons,
one of which was that the location of the painting was well known and
widely advertised, as was the painting's ownership history, which
specifically listed Seger-Thomschitz's Austrian ancestor. 125
Seger-Thomschitz alternatively argued that the case involved
important national interests, and the court should therefore apply the
federal common-law principle of equitable laches to alleviate
Massachusetts's harsh cutoff. 12 6
117. Mike Boehm, Supreme Court Won't Hear Looted-Art Claim Against Norton Simon,
L.A. TIMES ENT. BLOG "CULTURE MONSTER" (June 27, 2011, 3:35 PM), http://latimesblogs.
latimes.com/culturemonster/2011/06/supreme-court-holocaust-norton-simon.html.
118. Id.
119. Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 2010).
120. Id. at 2.
121. See id. at 3-6.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 7; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 968-69 (9th Cir.
2010).
124. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d at 7 (citation omitted).
125. Id. at 7-9.
126. Id. at 9.
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As in Von Saher, the court ruled in the museum's favor and
declined to apply equitable remedies.127 The court explained that
federal common law should be exercised narrowly and only when the
claimant can show a "significant conflict between some federal policy
or interest and the use of state law," since the decision to supersede
state law with federal rule is more appropriately determined by
Congress, not the courts.128 Seger-Thomschitz's argument focused on
the museum's tax-exempt status, claiming that its reason for being
tax-exempt hinged on the fact that museums provide public
benefits.129 She asserted that this tax-exempt status expressed a
federal policy to support museums' beneficial work, which was
undermined when the museum played an active part in accepting
stolen artwork and then escaping liability thanks to a favorable
statute of limitations.130 But the court found that the federal interest
in assuring the legal and beneficial work of tax-exempt museums was
properly served by subjecting the organizations to both state-law and
common-law fiduciary duties.131 The court stated: "We perceive no
need to create additional federal common law rules to punish and
deter bad behavior by tax-exempt organizations."132
Seger-Thomschitz then advanced a final argument: unlike the
claimant in Von Saher, Seger-Thomschitz sought preemption under
the foreign-affairs doctrine.133 She contended that the foreign-affairs
doctrine preempted the Massachusetts tatute of limitations due to an
alleged federal policy "disfavoring the application of rigid limitations
periods to claims for Nazi-looted artwork," as outlined in the
Holocaust Victims Redress Act of 1998, the Vilnius Forum
Declaration, the Washington Conference Principles on
Nazi-Confiscated Art, and the Terezin Declaration on Holocaust Era
Assets and Related Issues.134
But the court also found this argument unpersuasive.135 The
court noted that the aforementioned statute and three executive
agreements were merely "hortatory," creating no substantive law and
127. Id. at 11.
128. Id. at 10 (citing Atherton v. FDIC, 519 U.S. 213, 218 (1997)).
129. See id. at 9-10.
130. Id. ("She argues that the application of a state limitations period in this case would
frustrate the 'many discrete and compelling federal interests that inhere when judicial claims to
recover Nazi-confiscated artworks are brought against U.S. tax-exempt public trustees such as
the MFA."').
131. Id. at 10-11.
132. Id. at 11.
133. Id. at 11-12.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 12.
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only espousing a general dedication to ensuring justice for those
seeking to recover Nazi-confiscated property.136 Therefore, those four
sources of law did not amount to an express policy discouraging the
application of time requirements that may ultimately generate harsh
results: "the four documents are, for the most part, phrased in general
terms evincing no particular hostility toward generally applicable
statutes of limitations."13 7
The court went on to conclude that, even if an express federal
policy on the issue did exist, it would not clearly conflict with the state
statute of limitations.3 8 As opposed to Von Saher's unconstitutional
statute of limitations that narrowly applied to one specific group of
people for one particular purpose-restituting Nazi-looted art to
victims of Nazi persecution-"[t]he enactment of generally applicable
statutes of limitations is a traditional state prerogative, and states
have a substantial interest in preventing their laws from being used to
pursue stale claims."139  The court also highlighted both the
legislatively determined value of providing time requirements and the
flexibility of the discovery rule in the statute of limitations, thus
allegedly providing claimants with some ameliorating effects.140
The opinion concluded with a directive that museums should
resolve all title inquiries before acquiring any pieces with
"unmistakable roots in the Holocaust era," as suggested in the
guidelines in the American Association of Museums.141 But this
contention addressed only artwork that museums might acquire in the
future and not the property that they currently possess. 142
The application of equitable laches requires a high threshold
for claimants to surpass, as evidenced by Seger-Thomschitz and other
similar cases where the court declined to allow the claim to toll the
statute of limitations.1 43 In one such case, Grosz v. Museum of Modern
Art, the US District Court for the Southern District of New York,
136. Id. at 11-13.
137. Id. at 12.
138. Id. at 13.
139. Id. at 13-14 (emphasis added).
140. The First Circuit explains:
[The Massachusetts statute of limitations] strikes a reasonable balance between
restitution and repose, permitting a claimant who has diligently pursued her rights to
have her day in court. Indeed, because a claimant in a missing or confiscated art case
may be able to defeat summary judgment by demonstrating that she diligently
pursued her property, the Massachusetts discovery rule may not be that different in
practice from the federal common law laches defense that Seger-Thomschitz would
like us to apply.
Id. at 14.
141. Id. at 14-15.
142. Id.
143. See, e.g., Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 403 F. App'x 575 (2d Cir. 2010).
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applying New York state law, stated that ongoing settlement
negotiations between the museum and the claimant (prior to filing
suit) did not necessitate the extension of the statute of limitations
when the claimant still had the right to bring a replevin suit within
that time period.1 44  The court would grant laches only in an
exceptional case where the plaintiff could not properly have exercised
his rights, which normally would involve some sort of fraud or
deception on the part of the defendant. 145
As evidenced by Von Saher and Seger-Thomschitz, many
claimants face a lose-lose situation when it comes to the statute of
limitations.146 While the Von Saher court concluded that US federal
action on the issue of Nazi-art restitution was so pervasive that it
preempted state action under the foreign affairs doctrine, the
Seger-Thomschitz court concluded that such actions were merely
"hortatory" and therefore could not preempt a state statute of
limitations under an equitable laches theory.1 4 7 In response to Von
Saher, California passed another statute, section 338(c), to serve the
same purpose, but instead extended the time to bring suit for all
claimants seeking art restitution generally, whether or not it involved
Nazi looting.14 8  Though this appeared to solve the problem of
foreign-affairs infringement identified by the court, the US District
Court for the Central District of California ruled in May 2012 that it,
too, was unconstitutional.14 9  The court noted that, although the
statute did not facially reference Holocaust-art restitution, the two
California statutes had very similar language and the same apparent
purpose, meaning that section 338(c) also infringed on the federal
government's power to conduct foreign affairs.15 0
144. Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). The
court explains:
Nothing . . . prevented the plaintiffs from bringing suit during the period when
Katzenbach was reviewing the matter or at any time thereafter. Indeed, by January
18, 2006, litigation was clearly warranted-more than two years had passed since
plaintiffs had made their original demand, MoMA still had not returned the
Paintings, and it had repeatedly indicated that it would not do so.
Id.
145. Grosz, 403 F. App'x at 577.
146. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
147. See supra Part II.A.1-2.
148. Case Summary: Von Saher v. Norton Museum of Art, INT'L FOUND. FOR ART
RESEARCH, http://www.ifar.org/case-summary.php?docid=1286569240 (last visited Jan. 9, 2013).
149. Memorandum and Order Regarding Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Cassirer v.




3. Variations on Applications of the Statute of Limitations
While the Von Saher ruling may not be satisfying for Saher
herself, some claimants lack even the option to make a
constructive-notice argument, depending upon the jurisdiction in
which they bring suit.15 1 For example, a federal court applying
Michigan law declared that Michigan public policy weighed against
the application of the discovery rule in commercial-conversion cases.152
Therefore, the claim would have accrued when the alleged wrong
occurred, which, in this particular case, was 1938, when the original
owner sold the painting and fled to France to escape persecution.153
But there is some variation among the rules courts apply and
some seem, at least facially, to be more favorable for restitution
claimants. 154 For example, New York law typically promotes a
"demand-and-refusal" rule.1 55 Under the demand-and-refusal system,
a replevin claim accrues after the alleged rightful owner demands the
property's return and the possessor refuses to return it.156 Thus,
under New York law, the statute of limitations does not begin to run
until the possessor efuses demand. 157
New York specifically adopted this rule because it benefits
replevin claimants the most.15 8 The demand-and-refusal rule places
the burden on purchasers to research a piece's provenance, rather
than burdening claimants with the task of expending investigative
151. See Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 31, 2007).
152. Id. at *3.
153. See id. at *1, *3.
154. See, e.g., Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 403 F. App'x 575, 577 (2d Cir. 2010)
(applying New York's "demand and refusal" law rather than a discovery rule).
155. See Bakalar v. Vavra, 619 F.3d 136, 140-42 (2d Cir. 2010). The Second Circuit
explains:
[U]nder New York law, as Menzel v. List specifically held . . . absent other
considerations an artwork stolen during World War II still belongs to the original
owner, even if there have been several subsequent buyers and even if each of those
buyers was completely unaware that she was buying stolen goods.
Id. at 141 (internal quotation marks omitted).
156. See id. at 140-42.
157. See id.
158. See id. at 141-42. For an alternative point of view of the demand-and-refusal rule's
benefits, see Ashton Hawkins et al., A Tale of Two Innocents: Creating an Equitable Balance
Between the Rights of Former Owners and Good Faith Purchasers of Stolen Art, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 49, 51-52 (1995). Hawkins argues that under this rule, "New York effectively has no
statute of limitations for the recovery of stolen property, and innocent purchasers are perpetually
at risk of a claim of theft by a former owner." Id. at 51. On this theory, the rule over-protects
former owners who may allegedly be relieved of performing any due diligence in a timely fashion,
while restricting the rights of another innocent party-the good-faith purchaser. Id. at 60.
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resources within a limited timeframe.15 9 But heirs may still fall
outside the statute of limitations based on the court's definition of a
museum's "refusal."160 As evidenced by Grosz, a museum need not
give an explicit statement o constitute refusal.161 A court can instead
imply refusal if the museum's action "clearly conveys an intent to
interfere with the demander's possession or use of his property."162 A
museum can sometimes satisfy this standard without explicit words of
refusal or by a museum's attempts to ignore a demander.16 3
In Grosz, the claimant argued that the Museum of Modern
Art's refusal occurred when he received a letter from the museum
formally indicating that, after researching his claim, the Board of
Trustees had voted that it had no obligation to return the paintings he
sought.164 But the court held that the museum's refusal took place
almost one year prior to the sending of that letter, when the museum,
amidst settlement negotiations with Grosz, explained in a written
statement that it had considered all evidence, and there was no
definitive evidence contradicting the museum's ownership.165 The
statute of limitations therefore barred Grosz from bringing suit. 166
159. Bakalar, 619 F.3d at 141-42. Borrowing language from the lower court, the Second
Circuit explains:
[A] bill proposing that a museum would be immune from future claims once it gave
required public notice of acquisition and a three year statute of limitations period had
passed, ... was vetoed by Governor Mario Cuomo, who stated that . .. if it went into
effect, [it] would have caused New York to become a haven for cultural property stolen
abroad since such objects [would] be immune from recovery under the limited time
periods established by the bill.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Solomon R. Guggenheim Found. v. Lubell, 569 N.E.2d 426, 319
(N.Y. 1991)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
160. See Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 403 F. App'x 575, 577 (2d Cir. 2010).
161. See Grosz v. Museum of Modern Art, 772 F. Supp. 2d 473, 483-84 (S.D.N.Y. 2010).
162. Id. at 483 (citing Feld v. Feld, 720 N.Y.S.2d 35, 35 (App. Div. 2001)).
163. Id. at 484.
164. Id. at 485.
165. Glenn Lowry, MoMA's director, expresses the following in a letter to the Grosz
Estate's managing director:
We have . . . a fiduciary obligation to our collection. Before we remove a work from the
Museum's collection, we need to establish convincing and conclusive evidence that
another party . . . has ownership rights superior to the Museum's . . . . [W]e believe
that the available evidence does not lead to any definitive conclusion that challenges
the Museum's ownership of the picture. In fact, much of what we know argues in favor
of MoMA's clear title.
Id. at 484-85 (citation omitted)




Not all museums opt to litigate instead of granting
restitution. 167 Many museums have honored claims without the
initiation of a lawsuit.168 Typically, however, the reluctant stance
museums take parallels the sentiment they evince toward restitution
claims in general. Additionally, though museums may adhere to
several sets of ethical rules, such standards are not powerful enough
to procure results that may be more favorable to Holocaust claimants.
1. Museums, the Public Role They Serve, and Their Attitude toward
Restitution
The Declaration on the Importance and Value of Universal
Museums (Declaration) is indicative of museums' position on
art-looting restitution in general.169 The Declaration, signed in 2002
by the directors of some of the most renowned museums in the world,
espouses a "yes, but" sentiment: yes, museums should discourage the
trafficking of looted art, but such artifacts acquired in the past only
reflect the now-prohibited practices of a different time, and these
artifacts should remain in the museums that have cared for and
displayed them. 170
In the Declaration, museums basically grant themselves a
reprieve for displaying pieces that had been looted from other
countries when the art trade considered such looting acceptable or at
least turned a blind eye to it. 171 They now seek to show their current
good intentions by extolling the care with which they display the
artifacts and describing how such pieces are now an immutable part of
167. See Thompson, supra note 14, at 411-12.
168. Id. (noting that US museums such as the Art Institute of Chicago, the Detroit
Institute of Arts, the Metropolitan Museum of Art, and the Museum of Modern Art, have all
returned pieces to the heirs of Holocaust victims).
169. Reppas, supra note 23, at 105.
170. See id. at 105-06. Reppas highlighted part of the Declaration's text:
Over time, objects so acquired-whether by purchase, gift, or partage-have become
part of the museums that have cared for them, and by extension part of the heritage
of the nations which house them. Today we are especially sensitive to the subject of a
work's original context, but we should not lose sight of the fact that museums too
provide a valid and valuable context for objects that were long ago displaced from
their original source.
Id. (citation omitted).
171. One commentator noted how some museums turn a blind eye to the possibility of
acquiring illegally traded antiquities, pointing out that in 2006 the Getty Museum "found that
350 objects in their collection had disputed provenances." Lauren Fae Silver, Recapturing Art: A
Comprehensive Assessment of the Italian Model for Cultural Property Protection, 23 N.Y. INT'L L.
REV. 1, 11 (2010).
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the museum's own culture.17 2 As one recent example, the Nigerian
government has demanded that the Museum of Fine Arts in Boston
return thirty-two artifacts that a New York collector gifted to the
museum in June 2012, asserting that the British took the pieces as
spoils of war in 1897.173 So far, the museum has responded by stating:
"[A]fter careful deliberation, the Museum decided to accept the gift as
a way of sharing this private collection, giving access to these
long-hidden objects to our more than one million annual visitors."174
The debate over Nazi-restitution claims is similar to the debate
over the propriety of exhibiting other cultural property.'75 Two main
camps espouse competing theories regarding such property. "Cultural
internationalists" believe that cultural artifacts reflect a global
heritage and should be displayed worldwide, regardless of the original
owner.17 6  "Cultural nationalists," meanwhile, believe that such
property represents something special to the territory from which it
came and should thus be displayed in its place of origin.'77 Many
museums are cultural internationalists, which is unsurprising,
especially considering they were reluctant to repatriate art allegedly
looted from former colonies or occupied countries.7 8
Looting from "source countries"-countries "rich in art and
artifacts"-is still an ongoing phenomenon.'79 Recently, however,
some countries, including Turkey, Greece, and Italy, have been
successful in their restitution claims against US museums.80 Italy, in
172. Reppas, supra note 23, at 105-06.
173. Boston's Museum of Fine Arts Urged to Return Looted Artifacts to Nigeria,
HUFFPOST ARTS & CULTURE (July 20, 2012, 1:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/
20/bostons-museum-of-fine-ar n 1690062.html.
174. Tajudeen Sowole, Ahead of 2013 Show of Looted Benin Artefacts, U.S. Museum Plots
Legitimacy, GUARDIAN NIGERIA (Sept. 28, 2012), http://www.ngrguardiannews.com/index.php?
option=com-content&view=article&id=99914.
175. Leah J. Weiss, Note, The Role of Museums in Sustaining the Illicit Trade in
Cultural Property, 25 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 837, 870-71 (2007). Cultural property differs
from the art at issue here, which was once private property. See Walton, supra note 49, at
583-84. Cultural property is regulated separately through international and domestic sources,
including the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the 1983 Convention on Cultural Property
Implementation Act. See id. The 1970 UNESCO Convention defines cultural property as
something "specifically designated by each state as being of importance for archeology,
prehistory, history, literature, art or science." Id. at 583 (citation omitted).
176. Weiss, supra note 175, at 842-43 (highlighting that most museums and art-world
professionals still subscribe to the internationalist view, defining this theory as the "universal
museum concept" (quoting William Mullen, Museums Balk at Art Returns; Objects Acquired
Centuries Ago Not Negotiable, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 15, 2002, at Cl)).
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Silver, supra note 171, at 1-4.
180. Patty Gerstenblith, Controlling the International Market in Antiquities: Reducing
the Harm, Preserving the Past, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 169, 177 (2007).
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particular, has been able to recover many artifacts that thieves
illegally exported, achieving restitution agreements with the
Metropolitan Museum and the Boston Museum of Fine Arts, among
others.181  But individuals seeking restitution for
Holocaust-looted art cannot replicate the model these countries have
successfully used. Oftentimes museums predicated restitution on
receiving long-term loans of artwork in exchange, giving source
countries a strong bargaining position.182 Additionally, under national
protectionist laws,183 these countries often had much stronger legal
claims than the individuals at issue in this Note.1 8 4
Holocaust-art restitution cases lack both of these factors
because individual claimants do not possess any bargaining power
comparable to that of countries who can offer loaned artwork in
exchange for repatriation, and their legal claims are generally less
clear cut. Thus, many museums maintain the same "cultural
internationalist" attitude toward Nazi-acquired art that they have
concerning other "source country" art not being aggressively sought
after for repatriation. Indeed, the Advisory Commission noted that
"[a]s early as 1946, the State Department notified museums and other
institutions that stolen art was entering the country, but in the years
following the war it was not the standard practice for museums,
collectors and dealers to investigate the provenance of works they
acquired."185
But museums had to take a public stance on the
Nazi-restitution issue due to the recent increase of claims, the
accompanying publicity, and the Nazi atrocities pervading the
claims.186 When the Advisory Commission made its report over ten
years ago, it stated:
In an effort to forge a common policy in response to the Commissioners' concerns, the
directors present agreed to full disclosure, which means: (1) all Holocaust-era works will
be identified and disclosed and all provenance information in the possession of the
museums regarding those works will be disclosed; (2) such provenance information will
be disclosed, even where there are no known gaps; and (3) provenance research by
museums will be a continuing process with additional information disclosed as it
181. Silver, supra note 171, at 44-52.
182. Id. at 44-46.
183. Id. at 2, 19-25.
184. See Gerstenblith, supra note 180, at 177 n.36 ('The fact that these museums agreed
to return these artifacts suggests a recognition by the parties that Italy could likely have
recovered these artifacts in a legal action.").
185. See supra note 88.
186. See Weiss, supra note 175, at 870 (citing Gerstenblith, supra note 25, at 446).
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becomes known. They also agreed to restitution where claims are clearly
established. 187
Other researchers have noted that there is a disconnect
between the lofty mentality of the late 1990s actions and the current
method of operation.188 As scholar Bert Demarsin notes, "The dismay,
or perhaps even shame, and corollary obligingness of the late 1990s
that propelled many of the first cases to settlement quickly evolved
into dogged defense of ownership among current possessors."189 Thus,
museums are often still reluctant to look past the legalistic formalities
that obtain to ownership when discussing the possibility of restitution.
Opposition to restitution still exists. For example, the former
Exhibitions Secretary of the British Royal Academy of Arts, Sir
Normal Rosenthal, whose parents fled from Nazi persecution,
declared:
If valuable objects have ended up in the public sphere, even on account of the terrible
facts of history, then that is the way it is.... [T]he vast majority of individuals, who
were beaten up or killed during the Nazi period-or indeed by other oppressors in
different parts of Europe-did not have art treasures that their children and
grandchildren can now claim as compensation.
19 0
He proposed investing only in the future, as opposed to dwelling in the
past, and noted that financial gain (like bounty-hunter lawyers' fees,
for example) often motivates restitutionary efforts.191
Many disagree with Rosenthal's position, stating that heirs
need emotional closure, justice, and the fulfillment of a desire to
establish a connection to their persecuted ancestors.192 Additionally,
not only did families often find it difficult, both financially and
politically, to perform the provenance research for a suspected
heirloom, but they may not have wanted to broach and relive the
subject of personal tragedy.193 In past discussions of the topic, many
took for granted that the government should resolve this historical
187. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 88.
188. Demarsin, supra note 59, at 163.
189. Id.
190. Kreder, supra note 27, at 42-43 (quoting Sir Norman Rosenthal, The Time Has
Come for a Statute of Limitations, ART NEWSPAPER, Dec. 11, 2008, at 30).
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Weiss, supra note 175, at 866. Weiss explains:
[I]n the immediate post-war era, the psychology of Holocaust survivors made the
suggestion of the restitution of material possessions a "taboo" topic, as most were
grateful for having survived the war. "In many families it was impossible even to
mention the word Holocaust, distasteful to hint at the subject of restitution."
Id. (quoting Godfrey Barker, The Art of War, EVENING STANDARD, Dec. 8, 2006, at 24).
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injustice in favor of the claimant, but doing so would force an innocent
museum to incur substantial oss.
2. The Morality of Restitution
In the context of addressing historical injustices, property
restitution is often particularly contentious. In contrast to claims
handled by governmental commissions of inquiry or "addressed" with
government apologies, restitution claims can involve substantial
resources.19 4  Moral rights have often justified compensation for
historical injustices.195 Some theories question whether such moral
rights sufficiently outweigh the property rights of an innocent
adversary.19 6 This is particularly augmented when the direct victim is
generations removed from the claimant, who under normal
circumstances may never have received the property if the original
owner had made decisions that denied the property as a family
inheritance. 197 Presumably, though, the legislature took such
considerations into account when creating a cause of action for
replevin, and as courts have determined that current claimants have
standing to bring these claims, the fact that the claimants are not the
direct victims does not outright bar them from recovery.198
But it is also appropriate to account for the museum's general
interests, especially since museums serve a greater public purpose.19
Museums provide access to cultural and historic education, and a
piece of artwork, if properly maintained in a museum, can teach and
benefit a much broader audience than if the artwork remained in a
private home.200 Museums take their fiduciary duties seriously, which
is why many are hesitant to restitute a piece without substantial
evidence in support of the claim.201
Victims of Nazi-looting are not the only claimants seeking
restitution from museums.202 Museums could be worried that opening
the door to a particular type of restitution may open a "can of worms"
that will foster other restitution claims, either from private parties or
countries seeking to rectify the looting that occurred by Western
194. Katrina Miriam Wyman, Is There a Moral Justification for Redressing Historical
Injustices?, 61 VAND. L. REV. 127, 140 (2008).
195. Id. at 147.
196. Id. at 157.
197. Id.
198. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
199. See Gerstenblith, supra note 25, at 411-12.
200. See generally Thompson, supra note 14.
201. Id. at 423 n.107.
202. See, e.g., Konowaloff v. Metro. Museum of Art, No. 10 Civ. 9126 (SAS), 2011 U.S.
Dist. Lexis 107262, at *2-10 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 22, 2011).
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entities hundreds of years ago. Most recently, the heir of a Russian
merchant initiated a lawsuit against the Museum of Metropolitan Art,
alleging that the state took the merchant's paintings in 1918 pursuant
to a Bolshevik decree that granted the state full ownership of his
collection-without compensation or voluntary relinquishment.203 The
federal district court dismissed the claim, ruling that the "act of state"
doctrine prevented the heir from pursuing a replevin action.204 The
doctrine precludes US courts from considering the legitimacy of the
"public acts of a recognized foreign sovereign power committed within
its own territory."205
According to precedent, Bolshevik nationalization decrees
qualify as official acts that satisfy the doctrine, due to the historical
recognition of the Soviet government as a legitimate, acting state.206
Therefore, the legality of the painting's ultimate sale to the Museum
was irrelevant; since the Bolshevik's appropriation of the painting was
valid, the heir no longer had a proper stake of ownership in the
piece.207 Other articles have considered whether the doctrine may also
bar some Nazi restitution claims in the United States, since many
paintings were first restored to Allied governments that then
determined the fates of the artwork on their own. 208
3. Limits of Nonbinding Guidelines
Claimants have generally failed to successfully use museum
guidelines as a technical basis for legal claims. In one case before the
US District Court for the Northern District of Ohio, heirs argued that
the museum had waived its laches and statute-of-limitations defenses
based on its actions pursuant to the Guidelines Concerning the
Unlawful Appropriation of Objects During the Nazi Era, which the
American Association of Museums adopted in 1999.209 These
guidelines sought to "assist museums in addressing issues raised by
holding Nazi-era artwork in their collections."210 One such guideline
203. Id. at *3.
204. Id. at *16-18.
205. Id. at *13 (citing Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897)).
206. Id.
207. Id. at *18.
208. Kreder, supra note 110; see generally Bert Demarsin, The Third Time Is Not Always
a Charm: The Troublesome Legacy of a Dutch Art Dealer-The Limitation and Act of State
Defenses in Looted Art Cases, 28 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 255 (2010).
209. Toledo Museum of Art v. Ullin, 477 F. Supp. 2d 802, 808 (N.D. Ohio 2006). Even
though, in this instance, the original owner may have disposed of the painting under legitimate
circumstances, the case is significant because it highlights the limitations claimants face when




pronounced that museums should post on their websites artwork in
their possession with a Holocaust-era provenance.211 The Toledo
Museum of Art complied, listing the painting at issue on its website
and designating the claimant ancestor as the appropriate original
owner.212 The heirs brought suit to reclaim the piece and argued that
the museum had waived its defense to any statute-of-limitations
claims by adopting the guidelines and posting notice of the artwork,
considering this a "general invitation to the public to come forward,
make a claim, and collect damages."213
The district court held that a museum's mere act of posting the
relevant artwork on its website does not amount to an automatic
waiver of defenses, emphasizing that the guidelines did not intend to
impose an "undue burden" on these beneficial institutions.214 The
court further clarified that the purpose of the guidelines was not to
create a legally binding body of rules, but to assist museums in
behaving in a legal and moral manner when these cases arise.2 15
Therefore, the court granted the museum's declaratory motion against
the heir's replevin claim and found the cause of action time-barred.216
The US District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
reiterated this interpretation of the guidelines when the same heir
once again unsuccessfully raised the arguments above.217 The court
pointed out the permissive language of the guidelines: "[Iln order to
achieve an equitable and appropriate resolution of claims, museums
may elect to waive certain available defenses."218 Additionally, the
court stated that such an election would have to be clear and
intentional, an element lacking in the case, as evidenced by the
museum's desired method of resolution-initiating a claim to quiet
title. 219
Therefore, though museums and the US government have
addressed Nazi-art restitution in a vague, theoretical sense, rightful
claimants still face myriad obstacles. Courts apply varying standards
with differing, unjust results, and museums are often reluctant to
restitute a piece without absolute certainty of its illegal
211. Id. at 805.
212. Id. at 805, 808.
213. Id. at 808.
214. Id. at 809.
215. Id.
216. Id.
217. Detroit Inst. of Arts v. Ullin, No. 06-10333, 2007 WL 1016996, at *1-2 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 31, 2007).
218. Id. (citation omitted).
219. See id.
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provenance-a high evidentiary hurdle for most rightful claimants to
meet. Thus, fairness demands binding, uniform action.
III. SOLUTION
Within the past decade, scholars and those involved in the art
trade have proposed various solutions to address the ownership rights
of Nazi-looted art.2 2 0 These proposals include, inter alia, international
arbitration panels (some of which somewhat parallel the ICHEIC), 221 a
federal statute of limitations,222 a financial compensation or "display
of provenance" system,223 a federal ban on the harsh statutes of
limitation,224 and civil forfeiture.225 But courts are unwilling to adopt
any of the judicial solutions, and museums are not abiding strictly to
their self-policing rules and guidelines.226 More importantly, the
Advisory Commission specifically envisioned the federal government
taking a substantive role in art-restitution, stating, "[A]n organized
federal role .. . must be maintained."2 2 7 Indeed, the Commission even
recommended that "[t]he President should urge Congress to pass
legislation that removes impediments to the identification and
restitution of Holocaust victims' assets."2 2 8 Courts also necessitate
such a role for the federal government when they state, for example
(in Von Saher), that state legislatures cannot resolve the issue, and
such resolution must come, if at all, from the federal government.229 It
is necessary for the federal legislature to weigh the policy decisions
present in these cases, rather than allow courts to determine,
piecemeal, the rights of two parties that have both acted in good faith.
220. See, e.g., Pollock, supra note 1, at 194; Thompson, supra note 14, at 410.
221. See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Reconciling Individual and Group Justice with the
Need for Repose in Nazi-Looted Art Disputes: Creation of an International Tribunal, 73 BROOK. L.
REV. 155, 156-60 (2007).
222. See Redman, supra note 47, at 204.
223. See Walton, supra note 49, at 553.
224. See Stephanie Cuba, Note, Stop the Clock: The Case to Suspend the Statute of
Limitations on Claims for Nazi-Looted Art, 17 CARDOzO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 447, 449-50 (1999).
225. See Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Executive Weapons to Combat Infection of the Art
Market, 88 WASH U. L. REV. 1353, 1354 (2011).
226. See supra Part II.B.
227. Bronfman Transmittal Letter, supra note 43.
228. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 42.
229. Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 965-66 (9th Cir. 2010).
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A. Legislative Creation of a US Commission to Resolve Claims
Though it is the judiciary's role to determine the rights and
privileges of the parties before it, in these cases it is more appropriate
to have a legislative determination that balances the policy interests
of the two often innocent parties, since courts cannot make the real
wrongdoer, the Nazi Party, answer for its past actions.2 30  Such
legislative action is particularly relevant because courts around the
country have reached varying results and have applied varying
standards when adjudicating these cases.231 As one scholar studying
the issue stated, "It is nearly impossible for a judicial decision to
provide a means for recovery and simultaneously be fair to all sides,
as the adversarial system cannot take these multifaceted issues into
account."232  Additionally, "When it comes to true downstream
innocents, the point is not to punish, but rather to protect the market
from further infection and to assist claimants in accordance with the
Washington Principles, Vilnius Declaration, and Terezin
Declaration."23 3
Thus, the legislature should create a domestic resolution
mechanism binding on museums and claimants, should claimants
choose to use such an avenue for restitution, instead of litigating in
the courts.234 Beginning in 2010, key players involved with Nazi-art
230. See Redman, supra note 47, at 224. Redman explains:
There are features of Congress that make it a logical place for this issue to be
resolved. Congress is well equipped to deal with an issue that is very complex, with
claims that are over fifty years old and thousands of pieces of art that have entered
the international art market. To consider a solution to the problem, vast amounts of
data must be gathered and analyzed. First of all, Congress has the power to
investigate issues related to proposed legislation. Hand and hand [sic] with this power
are the resources necessary to carry out the investigation. In addition, Congress is the
proper forum for making difficult policy determinations that favor one innocent party
above another (the victim of art expropriation versus the innocent purchaser) since it
is a branch of government that must answer politically to the people of the United
States.
Id. (citations omitted).
231. Id. at 223-24.
232. Pollock, supra note 1, at 228.
233. Kreder, supra note 225, at 1362.
234. As a nonprofit institution, a museum's legal existence can take a variety of forms
(including, inter alia, a trust, partnership, or public or private museum), and a discussion about
the many state statutory and common-law rules that govern these forms is beyond the scope of
this Note. See Ralph E. Lerner, The Nazi Art Theft Problem and the Role of the Museum: A
Proposed Solution to Disputes Over Title, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 15, 16 (1998). Should a
question arise regarding the federal government's jurisdiction to create a commission with
binding effect on private museums, however, there are many possible avenues to consider. Under
the low threshold for gaining jurisdiction under the Commerce Clause, "the billion dollar art
trade is irrefutably 'commerce,"' and the Commerce power includes the "power to prohibit trade
of stolen goods." See Stephanie Cuba, supra note 224, at 480. Additionally, the federal
government has already enacted a comprehensive scheme to regulate the research and return of
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restitution, including some officials that were involved with the
Terezin Declaration, have discussed the possibility of creating a US
State Department Commission (Commission) to handle Nazi-art
restitution claims.235 Such a mechanism would provide a
comprehensive means of implementing a domestic resolution. With
domestic legislation, the United States could control the time and
manner in which claimants could bring suit against domestic
museums. But the early literature surrounding the creation of this
Commission has suggested that it would still be nonbinding.236 In
order for the commission to have true teeth, it must have binding
jurisdiction over both parties (claimants and museums) when an heir
seeks restitution from a museum; otherwise, it is likely that such a
mechanism will be as ineffective as museum self-regulation.
But such a commission that hears claims is not meant to
completely lessen any traditional standards that claimants must
satisfy when filing in court, as that would expose museums to
meritless inquiries. In order to successfully achieve a resolution with
a museum under this scheme, a claimant must still meet some
threshold requirements he would have had to meet in court, such as
having the proper standing (i.e., by presenting a will or some sort of
documentary evidence that the heirs have a legitimate claim to the
artwork).237 This initial threshold equates to a motion-to-dismiss
standard to ensure that he at least has a legitimate claim for
restitution. But the claimant will not face the statute-of-limitations
problem he would face in court, and the Commission would get federal
certain Native American objects under the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
Act, with jurisdiction contingent on the museum receiving federal funds. Frequently Asked
Questions, NAT'L PARK SERV., http://www.nps.gov/nagpra/FAQ (last visited Oct. 1, 2012). Many
private museums receive some federal funding, though the amount may be very small. See, e.g.,
To Charge or What to Charge?, ART NEWSPAPER (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.theartnewspaper.
com/articles/To+charge+ or+what+to+charge%3F/24451. But the amount of funding has no
disposition on the statute's binding effect. Another possibility would be to make museums'
501(c)(3) tax-exempt status contingent on participation in the commission. "Section 501(c)(3)
organizations must be aware of the possibility of having their tax-exempt status revoked if they
engage in actions that influence legislation or fail to serve a public purpose . . . ." Joseph F.
Sawka, Note, Reconciling Policy and Equity: The Ability of the Internal Revenue Code to Resolve
Disputes Regarding Nazi-Looted Art, 17 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 91, 111 (2009)
(proposing that museums and claimants seeking restitution for Nazi-looted art resolve their
disputes through settlements involving tax-code deductions under §§ 501(c)(3) and 170).
235. Jennifer Anglim Kreder, Wrestling the Dead Hand of History: Perspectives on a
Proposed State Department Commission on Nazi Looted Art, 1 CULTURAL HERITAGE & ARTS REV.
6, 6-7 (2010).
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art, 592 F.3d 954, 968 (9th Cir.
2010) (noting that the district court ruled the claimant's action time-barred because the statute
of limitations had run before she inherited her interest in the paintings at issue, implying an
interest in the paintings was necessary to bring suit).
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funding to alleviate the financial burdens both claimants and
museums face in performing costly provenance research. With the
financial help, museums may feel less like the Commission is
something they must participate in and more like it is a helpful
method of resolution. The Advisory Commission recognized the costs
faced by both parties in these claims, noting that provenance research
is "costly and time consuming, often involving access to records that
are hard to obtain."238 Because of this, in addition to the Commission
receiving an appropriation of federal funds, Congress should allow
private groups and individuals to make charitable, tax-deductible
donations to the Commission.239 The Advisory Commission supported
the idea of using tax-deductible donations to fund a federal foundation
to research the provenance of potential Holocaust-looted art.240
The Commission should first consider the appropriate method
of resolution under legal rules and then use more equitable factors to
determine the outcome if legal rules do not provide a clear answer.
For example, if Nazis unequivocally looted the artwork at issue, and
only the statute of limitations precluded the claimant from restitution,
then the Commission would not need to resolve the case using
equitable factors when legal rules clearly provide the correct result.
The same holds true when the former owner of a piece of art sold it
under legitimate circumstances. A normal art market still existed
during the war, and, before becoming victims of the Holocaust, many
individuals sold their artwork in a standard transaction for fair
market value.241 If the evidence indicates that the then-owner sold
the artwork in a routine transaction for a fair price with no
questionable gaps in provenance, then legal rules would dictate that
the artwork should not be restituted. This position respects the stance
that courts have taken in declining to accept the proposition that all
Jewish individuals in the post-1933 European art market made their
sales under duress. Though the United States did suggest that other
countries adopt such a proposition in the immediate aftermath of the
war, that theory is too extreme, as it is unjust toward rightful
purchasers and countered by factual evidence.242
238. PRESIDENTIAL ADvisoRY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 88.
239. Donations should remain anonymous to the Commission adjudicators in order to
avoid a conflict of interest if a potential defendant-museum donates in hopes of receiving a more
favorable result.
240. PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES,
supra note 42.
241. See Kreder, supra note 221, at 181 ("[Q]uite a few sales were legitimate. In fact,
some survivors were able to sell art on the open market at fair prices, which enabled them to
obtain safe passage for themselves and their families to the United States and other countries.").
242. See id.
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When claims are more factually complicated, as they so often
are, the Commission should resolve the case by balancing equitable
factors such as: (1) how much research the museum put into the
artwork's provenance when the museum first acquired the piece; (2)
whether the artwork's provenance has gaps to suggest a period of
unknown and possibly illegal ownership;243 and (3) what sort of plans
the museum has for the piece (i.e., will it be on display or stored away,
and which choice promotes the best public good). Members of the Art
Loss Register regularly negotiate with museums on behalf of
Nazi-restitution claimants;244 those members, along with various
similarly situated professionals practicing in art law and the art
business generally, are qualified to make these kinds of
determinations as adjudicators for the Commission.245 In addition to
these experts, it may be appropriate to have a former judge act as an
adjudicator for the Commission as well, particularly since the UK
Spoliation Advisory Panel has had success with two former judges as
its chairmen.246 However such adjudicators choose to balance these
and other factors, they should do so as consistently as possible to try
and create uniformity in their decisions. Each claim will of course
have unique facts, however, and the Commission should decide what
would be fairest under these factors: restitution, compensation, a
display of provenance, or granting an undivided half interest to each
party,247 among other options.
Additionally, the statute creating such a Commission should
have a sunset provision to provide repose for museums, and the
Commission should only accept claims for ten years. The UK
Holocaust (Return of Cultural Objects) Act, passed in 2009 to allow
claimants to seek restitution on moral grounds, has a legislative life of
ten years.248 One US attorney experienced in the art trade noted that
a claim involving artwork stolen during World War II takes between
243. The Presidential Advisory Commission on Holocaust Assets stated that "gaps in
provenance do not create a presumption that a work was looted but merely present an
opportunity for claimants to come forward with the understanding that they would have to meet
the burden of proof currently required by law." PRESIDENTIAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON HOLOCAUST
ASSETS IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 88.
244. See Jackson, supra note 16.
245. Marion Maneker, A Look at Art Loss Register, ART MARKET MONITOR (Apr. 22,
2009), http://artmarketmonitor.com/2009/04/22/a-closer-look-at-the-art-loss-register.
246. Government Bodies: Spoliation Advisory Panel-United Kingdom, LOOTEDART.COM,
http://www.lootedart.com/MFEU4P88744 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013).
247. See, e.g., Case Summary: Goodman v. Searle, INT'L FOUND. FOR ART RESEARCH,
http://www.ifar.org/case-summary.php?docid=1179627363 (last visited Jan. 11, 2013) (providing
an example of a museum and claimant settling on an undivided half-interest scheme).
248. Charlotte Woodhead, UK Restitution Update: The Holocaust (Return of Cultural
Objects) Act 2009, 1 CULTURAL HERITAGE & ARTS REV. 25, 25-26 (2010).
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seven and twelve years to resolve.2 4 9 Ten years would also provide
ample time to generate enough publicity so that all rightful claimants
will have the best possible chance of hearing about the Commission
and bringing a claim if they so desire.
If a claimant does not bring a claim within the requisite time
period and later files a lawsuit, the US government should submit a
statement on behalf of the museum asserting that public policy favors
dismissal, in the same manner that it does for the German Foundation
(as described in Part I of this Note). 2 50 The statement should express
that the appropriate forum to decide the claim would have been the
Commission. It is true that museums often win in the early stages of
litigation because the statute of limitations bars the claimant, but
such a statement would still mitigate the time and cost a museum
incurs in preparing a defense. Additionally, courts should bar
claimants from bringing suit against a museum if they have already
sought to resolve the claim through the Commission and are unhappy
with the result. Jurisdiction is binding for both parties (once
claimants decide to seek restitution through the Commission), and
thus the courts should foreclose the alternative judicial avenue to
claimants for the same claim.
Such a commission avoids the undesirable effect of a prolonged
statute of limitations. First, it is true that oftentimes museums
acquired pieces in good faith, and they should not be susceptible to
litigation for an indefinite amount of time. Second, it is also unlikely
that the legislature would allow such a rule, particularly when the
statutes of limitation are a traditional designation of state power. The
legislature would also want to restrict actionable claims with the
Commission to Nazi-looting claims in order to avoid opening the "can
of worms" of museum restitution from all periods throughout
history.251 Whether or not that is the correct result under a
moral-rights theory is a separate question,2 52 but in practical terms,
the government will not want to expose US museums to constant
restitution attacks for every piece taken from a foreign jurisdiction,
even if some may support such a theory in principle. This balance
reflects tough policy decisions but decisions that are necessary to
create uniformity and promote justice and the public good.
249. Lerner, supra note 234, at 36.
250. See HOLOCAUST VICTIM ASSETS LITIGATION (SWISS BANKS), supra note 64 and
accompanying text.
251. See supra Part II.B.2.
252. For a discussion of this issue, see Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Reparations
for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 689 (2003).
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B. Jurisdiction over All Pieces of Art? Implications of the Foreign
Cultural Exchange Judicial Immunity Clarification Act
As this resolution scheme is a domestic one governing only US
museums, Congress would have to determine whether the statute
should also govern foreign pieces of artwork that are temporarily
displayed in the United States on loan from international museums.253
It is interesting to note that the United States has been somewhat
passive in handling Nazi-art-restitution cases involving domestically
owned paintings, but it has alternatively been aggressive in filing
claims (under the National Stolen Property Act) to seize loaned foreign
pieces once they enter the United States if the government believes
Nazis stole the artwork as part of their looting.254 Normally, the
Immunity from Judicial Seizure statute protects objects of cultural
significance, imported into the United States for temporary exhibition,
from judicial seizure in order to encourage cultural loans from
abroad.255 But in March 2012, Congress introduced a bill entitled the
"Foreign Cultural Exchange Judicial Immunity Clarification Act,"
which would provide a limited exception for Nazi-looted art.256
The bill had not passed as of February 20, 2013, and those
opposed to it worry that it will prevent foreign museums from loaning
work to the United States.257 But passage of the bill would obviously
affect the jurisdiction of the Commission or the similar resolution
scheme proposed in this Note. If the Commission could not hear
claims involving foreign paintings on loan, it may draw criticism for
being too narrowly construed, since a large volume of artwork is often
253. This issue is most famously highlighted in United States v. Portrait of Wally, 663 F.
Supp. 2d 232 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). In 1997, New York's Museum of Modern Art (MoMA) exhibited a
painting on loan from the Austrian Leopold museum. Id. at 246. The painting ("Wally") had a
long and tangled history of ownership, and the estate of its 1930s Austrian-Jewish owner
asserted that the painting had either been stolen by the Nazis or granted to them under duress
when their ancestor fled the country to avoid persecution. Id. at 236-38. After the MoMA exhibit
ended, the New York District Attorney's Office issued a subpoena for the painting, claiming that
the Leopold Museum had violated the National Stolen Property Act by knowingly shipping a
stolen artifact into the United States. Id. at 236. The court, after many years of litigation, ruled
that a triable issue of fact existed as to whether the Leopold knew that "Wally" had been stolen,
and therefore knew its illegal status when exporting it to the United States. Id. at 237. Before a
jury could resolve the issue, the two parties settled. Thompson, supra note 14, at 438-39. The
painting was eventually returned to the Leopold after the museum paid the heirs $19 million. Id.
254. See Portrait of Wally, 663 F. Supp. 2d at 232; see also Laura Gilbert, Italy Caves on
Restitution, Defaults After U.S. Seizes Painting in Florida, ART UNWASHED BLOG (Jan. 10 2012,
7:49 PM), http://art-unwashed.blogspot.com/2012/01/italy-caves-on-restitution-defaults.html.
255. See Nikki Georgopulos, Revisiting Senate Bill 2212-Part One, PLUNDERED ART






displayed via a loan. The bill itself has also drawn criticism for
providing an exception only for Nazi-looted art, thereby impeding
redress for cultural looting outside that specific context.258  One
international law specialist asked: "Why are Nazi storm troopers
looting art any different from Bolshevik storm troopers?"259 Whether
or not one agrees with this criticism, as this Note has shown, such a
narrow exception keeps with the general attitude that museums and
the government have displayed in the past. The government has
vaguely addressed Nazi restitution, while at the same time trying to
avoid exposing US museums to general restitution claims from any
type of prior looting.260
Indeed, museums support the bill because, outside of the
Holocaust-art exception, the bill strengthens their immunity from suit
for exhibiting loaned artifacts of questionable provenance.261 Under
the current law, a US museum must get a special waiver from the
State Department to protect a loaned piece of art from seizure while
the museum exhibits it in the country.262 But, feeling that this
protection is no longer sufficient, museums seek to eliminate the
waiver requirement in the new bill and institute a per se bar
preventing any claimants from filing suit against them.2 63 Even with
the narrow exception for Holocaust-art restitution, opponents of the
bill fear that such claimants will face a more difficult legal struggle if
Congress passes the bill. 2 6 4  This proposed bill exemplifies why
claimants need a binding legislative mechanism to resolve
Holocaust-era-restitution claims. Museums continue to adhere to
their "cultural internationalist" perspective while espousing vague
commitments to restituting Nazi-looted art that are-to use a word
from the Seger-Thorrschitz court-merely "hortatory."2 6 5
IV. CONCLUSION
The problem of Holocaust-era art restitution has been
discussed worldwide, and there is general agreement that there needs
to be justice. But the popular sentiment and resolutions to rectify
258. Id.
259. Doreen Carvajal, Dispute Over Bill on Borrowed Art, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/20l2/05/22/arts/design/dispute-over-bill-to-protect-art-lent-to-
museums.html.
260. See supra Part 1I.B.




265. Museum of Fine Arts, Bos. v. Seger-Thomschitz, 623 F.3d 1, 11 (1st Cir. 2010).
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these injustices lack teeth in the United States, and no substantial,
comprehensive, and rational method of implementation exists.266
Despite the ethics and guidelines to which museums adhere, the
self-enforcement of these guidelines is just the problem-there is no
outside, binding regulation to force museums into a specific course of
action.267 Though many museums perform due diligence in their
provenance work and espouse lofty goals of justice and fairness, a
mandatory legislative mechanism should bind these museums in order
to help realize such goals.
Such a mandatory legislative mechanism is particularly
necessary considering the passive role that courts have played in
adjudicating Nazi-looting claims.268 Fears of interfering with the
executive branch and foreign affairs have led courts to dismiss these
matters, evincing an aversion to applying equitable tolling when a
statute-of-limitations challenge is involved.269 Because one-on-one
litigation will not solve the overarching problem, the legislature
should step in. Indeed, it is the legislature's duty to weigh difficult
policy decisions, particularly in cases such as the ones this Note
presents, in which the two parties involved in the litigation may both
be "innocent" of any wrongdoing and forced into the predicament due
to Nazi actions over sixty years ago.27 0
But in all practicality, the legislature will be fearful of opening
a "can of worms" and will not want museums to face restitution claims
for alleged looting from any time period, whether or not this result is
really the "just" thing to do. Instead, the legislature should mitigate
financial and procedural burdens rightful claimants face but protect
museums' interests by requiring a threshold evidentiary level for a
claim and establishing a sunset period for the legislation.
Katharine N. Skinner*
266. See supra Parts I.A, II.
267. See supra Part II.B.3.
268. See supra Part II.A.
269. See supra Part II.A.
270. See, e.g., Hawkins, supra note 7, at 49-54.
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